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I 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION OF THE: C"I i J RT OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§ 35-1-82.53(2), -86(1994), and § 63-
46b-16(1993). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the Industrial Commission of Utah properly exclude from 
evidence a medical report from Dr. Scott Knorpp on the grounds 
that the Petitioners, Stampede Trucking and the Workers' 
Compensation Fund of Utah (hereinafter "WCF"), did not submit it 
within one week of the hearing as required by Utah Admin. Code 
R568-1-4.J? The WCF provided Dr. Knorpp's report to Kimball (the 
injured worker) less than two hours before the hearing and did 
not provide the report to the Commission until after the hearing 
had begun. (R. at 364-69) . 
STANDARD OF REVIEW: 
1. Under Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(ii) and 
(iv)(1993), the appellate court determines whether the agency's 
application of the rule, in this case R568-1-4.J, was reasonable 
and rational by applying an intermediate standard of review. 
Thorup Bros. Constr. Inc. v. Auditing Div., 860 P2d. 324, 327 
(Utah 1993). 
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2. Before the appellate court can review an agency action 
under U.C.A. § 63-46b-16(4)(h)(iii), the Petitioners must 
establish a prima facie case that the action was contrary to 
prior practice. If a prima facie case is shown, the agency must 
"demonstrate a fair and rational" basis for its action. Pickett 
v. Utah Dept. of Comm., 858 P.2d 187, 191 (Utah App. 1993)(citing 
SEMCO v. Utah State Tax Comm'n, 849 P.2d 1167, 1174 (Utah 
1993)(Durham, J., dissenting)). In this case, the Petitioners 
have not presented any evidence showing that the Industrial 
Commission's application of R568-1-4.J is contrary to agency 
policy, let alone, establishing a prima facie case. 
3. The Petitioners argue that the exclusion of Dr. Knorpp's 
report was tantamount to either a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal for 
failure to state a claim or a Rule 56 dismissal for summary 
judgment. However, both Rule 12(b)(6) and 56 concern dismissing 
an entire case when the proper motion is made. Neither a 
12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim nor a 56 motion for 
summary judgment was made or granted. The case was still tried 
on its merits. 
4. To determine whether a medical panel should have been 
convened, the Court applies an abuse of discretion standard. 
Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Comm'n, 703 P.2d 306, 308 
(Utah 1985); Workers' Comp Fund v. Industrial Comm'n, 761 P.2d 
572, 577 (Utah App. 1988). 
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Ill 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The following statutes and Rules, of which the full text can 
be found in the appendix, are determinative in this appeal: 
Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4. Pleadings and Discovery. 
J. All medical records shall be filed by the employer or 
its insurance carrier as a single joint medical exhibit at 
least one week before the scheduled hearing. Claimant must 
cooperate and submit all pertinent medical records contained 
in his file to the employer or its insurance carrier for the 
joint exhibit submission two weeks in advance of the 
scheduled hearing. Exhibits are to be placed in an indexed 
binder arranged by a care provider in chronological order. 
Exhibits should include all relevant treatment records with 
the exception of hospital nurses notes. 
Utah Admin. Code R568-1-9. Guidelines for Utilization of Medical 
Panel• 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the Commission adopts 
the following guidelines in determining the necessity of 
submitting a case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law 
Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue 
must be shown by conflicting medical reports. 
Significant medical issues are involved when there 
are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent 
physical impairment which vary more than 5% 
of the whole person, 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the 
temporary total cutoff date which vary more 
than 90 days, and/or 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting 
to more than $2,000. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88. Rules of evidence and procedure before 
commission and hearing examiner - Admissible evidence. 
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner shall be 
bound by the usual common-law or statutory rules of 
evidence, or by any technical or formal rules of procedure, 
other than as herein provided or as adopted by the 
commission pursuant to this act. The commission may make 
its investigation in such manner as in its judgment is best 
calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the 
parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the Workers' 
Compensation Act. 
The commission may receive as evidence and use as proof 
of any fact in dispute all evidence deemed material and 
relevant including, but not limited to the following: 
(a) Depositions and sworn testimony presented in open 
hearings. 
(b) Reports of attending or examining physicians, or of 
pathologists. 
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by the 
commission. 
(d) Reports of employers, including copies of time 
sheets, book accounts or other records. 
(e) Hospital records in the case of an injured or 
diseased employee. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16. Judicial review - Formal 
adjudicative proceedings. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the 
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person 
seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by 
any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which 
the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its 
face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction 
conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied 
the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or 
decision-making process, or has failed to follow 
prescribed procedure; 
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(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally 
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject 
to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of 
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light 
of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the 
agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, 
unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by 
giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair 
and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
IV 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Petitioners seek review of the Industrial Commission's 
Order denying their Motion for Review of the ALJ's grant of 
Worker's Compensation benefits. The WCF had Kimball seen by 
their Independent Medical Examination physician who completely 
agreed with Kimball's treating physician on all medical aspects 
of the case. There was no conflicting evidence concerning this 
case until the WCF tried to introduce a file review by Dr. Knorpp 
after the trial before the Industrial Commission had already 
begun. That file review was excluded because it was in violation 
of Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.J. With no conflicting medical 
evidence in the case, the ALJ and the Industrial Commission did 
not seek the opinion of a medical panel and awarded benefits to 
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Kimball. The Petitioners now seek to have Dr. Knorpp's report 
admitted into evidence and the case retried. 
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
Kimball filed an Application for Hearing on October 25, 
1994. (R. at 2-5). He was requesting medical treatment and 
temporary total compensation that both the treating physician and 
the WCF's doctor had prescribed. On November 1, 1994, the 
Industrial Commission of Utah filed a Request for Answer on 
Stampede Trucking and the WCF. On November 14, 1994, Stampede 
Trucking and the WCF filed their Answer. 
An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) conducted the hearing on 
March 7, 1995, and entered her Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Order on April 19, 1995. (R. at 252-269). The ALJ 
found that Dr. Knorpp's report was inadmissible because (a) 
Dr. Knorpp had not examined Kimball and (b) the WCF is entitled 
to only one IME under Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.H. 
The WCF filed a Motion for Review on May 18, 1995 and 
Kimball filed a Response to the Defendants' Motion on May 30, 
1995. (R at 271-84; 350-60). 
Although the Industrial Commission disagreed with the ALJ's 
Conclusions of Law concerning Dr. Knorpp's report, it denied 
WCF's Motion for Review on September 29, 1995 stating that 
Dr. Knorpp's report was inadmissible evidence because the WCF did 
not file it within the time limits set by R568-1-4.J. The 
Commission determined that a medical panel was not necessary and 
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that the ALJ's findings and decision were sufficient, and 
reemphasized the following: 
1. Since July 1994, Kimball has been treated for 
frontal occipital headaches, severe neck and shoulder 
pain, and myofacial syndrome. 
2. The conditions were medically caused by the March 
15, 1993 industrial accident. 
3. The treatment rendered through [December 31] 1994 
was reasonable and necessary. 
4. Kimball was temporarily totally disabled after July 
22, 1994 until at least January 1, 1995. (R. at 364-
69) . 
The WCF filed a Motion for Reconsideration on October 18, 
1995 and Kimball filed a Response to the Motion for 
Reconsideration on November 1, 1995. (R. at 372-81; R. at 461-
68) . 
The Industrial Commission denied the WCF's Motion for 
Reconsideration on November 1, 1995 for the following reasons: 
1. No support was given for the assertion that it is 
customary to violate R568-1-4.J. 
2. 35-1-108 (1) (B) (1) commonly refers to "managed 
health care" and is inapplicable to the case. 
3. Willardson does not justify convening a medical 
panel because no conflicting evidence was on the record 
in the case at hand. (R. at 469-72). 
After the Industrial Commission denied the Petitioners' Motion 
for Reconsideration, the Petitioners filed this appeal. 
C. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 15, 1993, John Kimball sustained a compensable 
industrial injury when he was involved in a motor vehicle 
accident while driving in the course and scope of his employment 
with Stampede Trucking. (R. at 253). Kimball received both 
temporary total disability compensation and medical expenses from 
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the WCF. He was released to work on July 22, 1993 although he 
was greatly restricted and still injured. (R. at 234-35). He 
continued to work until July 22, 1994, at which time he obtained 
additional medical treatment as a result of the industrial 
injury. The WCF denied payment for the additional treatments and 
temporary total disability compensation for the period beginning 
July 22, 1994, deeming the treatments medically unnecessary and 
not causally related to the March 15, 1993 industrial injury. 
(R. at 253) . 
At that time, the Petitioners ordered an independent medical 
examination (IME) of Kimball and promised to pay any additional 
compensation if the IME indicated that it would be required. (R. 
at 6, 2 61). The WCF chose Dr. J. Criss Yelton to perform the IME 
on October 5, 1994. (R. at 6). The IME indicated that the 
Respondents' medical treatment was appropriate, that he had not 
stabilized, and that a maximum medical improvement would probably 
take another six months. (R. at 37, 41-42). However, the WCF 
still refused to pay any benefits, and they put Kimball under 
surveillance on November 7, 8, and 9, 1994. Nevertheless, the 
surveillance became problematic for the WCF because it showed 
only that Kimball was impaired and disabled. (R. at 521-22). 
On approximately January 12, 1995, the WCF telephoned 
Kimball's counsel and offered a completely unsatisfactory 
settlement offer. Kimball rejected the offer later that same 
day. (R. at 454). 
8 
Shortly thereafter, the WCF telephoned Kimball's counsel a 
second time to suggest a direct referral to a medical panel. 
Kimball immediately rejected this proposal also because there was 
no conflicting medical evidence or any reason for the WCF to not 
pay full benefits. (R. 354, 454). 
On February 14, 1995, the WCF sent a letter (commonly 
referred to as a Rule 490-1-4.J letter) to Kimball's counsel 
stating that the deadline for submitting additional records to 
the joint exhibit would be one week before the date of trial as 
outlined in R568-1-4.J. (R. at 459, 460). 
The Petitioners, in their Statement of Facts, state the 
following: "Counsel [meaning Kimball's counsel] elected to put 
off receiving and reviewing the [medical] exhibit until the day 
of the hearing." (Petitioners' brief at 11, Line 5). They then 
state, "He [Kimball's counsel] actually received Dr. Knorpp's 
report by fax before he received the medical records exhibit," 
(Petitioners' brief at 19, Lines 8-10)(emphasis added), and 
"Counsel for Kimball opted to have WCF deliver the exhibit to him 
on the day of hearing." (Petitioners' brief at 19, Lines 5-6). 
These statements are simply not true. On February 20, 1995, 
Kimball's counsel telephoned the WCF and requested the complete 
medical exhibit in the Kimball case. On February 22, 1995, the 
WCF sent the complete medical exhibit to Kimball's counsel with a 
cover letter dated February 22, 1995. (Appendix B). 
The Petitioners also argued that they were delayed in 
referring this case to Dr. Knorpp for their file review because 
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they needed additional medical records. Unfortunately, this 
assertion is misleading. The medical exhibit packet sent to 
Kimball on February 22, 1995 is exactly the same packet that 
Dr. Knorpp reviewed. It is also the same packet that was 
presented to the Industrial Commission and Kimball as the medical 
exhibit in this case. (see Appendix B). The Respondents are 
extremely disappointed that the Petitioners would try to mislead 
the Court of Appeals in this manner. 
Kimball had the total medical record exhibit on February 23, 
1995, and used such, as usual, to prepare for trial. In fact, on 
or about February 28, 1995, the WCF requested that, because they 
had problems obtaining the latest reports from Kimball's treating 
physician, Mr. Kimball bring them with him when he came to the 
hearing. Kimball agreed and brought these medical records with 
him. (R. at 529, Lines 15-25). 
On March 6, 1995 (the night before the trial), at 5:43 p.m., 
the WCF faxed Kimball's counsel a copy of Dr. Knorpp's medical 
report. (R. at 454, 477). Kimball's counsel had only two 
business hours to review the report before the hearing, half of 
which was spent driving to Salt Lake for the trial. This two-
hour period was also the only time Kimball had to formulate any 
objections to the report. (R. at 356). The Industrial 
Commission did not receive the report until after the hearing had 
begun. (R. at 477). 
During the hearing, Kimball's counsel apologized to the 
WCF's attorney and the ALJ because he had forgotten to bring the 
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recent medical reports from Kimball's treating physician that the 
WCF had requested. By stipulation, the record was left open so 
those records could be made part of the medical exhibit. (R. at 
529) . 
V 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission correctly applied Utah Admin. Code 
R568-1-4.J to exclude Dr. Knorpp's medical report from the 
hearing on Kimball's Workers' Compensation claim. This is 
because it was not introduced into evidence until after the trial 
had begun. If the medical report had been admitted, it would 
have been a trial by surprise. This would have been unfair to 
the Commission whose duty it is to run an efficient and fair 
tribunal and it would have greatly prejudiced the opposing party. 
The Industrial Commission would be in chaos if numerous 
conflicting medical exhibits were allowed to be introduced for 
the first time at trial (i.e. the Functional Capacity Test, 
rehabilitation evaluations, file review or IMEs). If this were 
allowed to happen, no one, including the parties or the Judge, 
could adequately prepare for trial. 
Kimball specifically objected to Knorpp's report at the 
trial and presented the timeliness argument (R568-1-4.J) at the 
Motion for Review level. At trial, Kimball did not have adequate 
time to prepare all-inclusive objections to the admission of the 
report. This constituted an exceptional circumstance and allowed 
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Kimball to properly raise objections in his Response to the 
Defendants1 Motion for Review. The Petitioners have not shown 
any proof that the agency's action was against prior practice nor 
that the action was contrary to the rule. Because Dr. Knorpp's 
report was not admitted into evidence and was not part of the 
record, there were no medical opinions in controversy. 
Therefore, a medical panel was not necessary for this case. 
VI 
ARGUMENT 
A* DR. KNORPP/S MEDICAL REPORT IS INADMISSABLE EVIDENCE 
BECAUSE WCF DID NOT SUBMIT IT WITHIN THE ONE WEEK TIME LIMIT 
UNDER R568-1-4.J. 
The Industrial Commission had the authority to bar Dr. 
Knorpp's report because the WCF had not filed it according to 
Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.J independently of the ALJ's reasoning 
prohibiting it from becoming evidence. "While it is the ALJ who 
initially hears the evidence, the Commission is the ultimate fact 
finder." Chase v. Industrial Comm'n, 872 P2d. 475, 479 (Utah 
App. 1994) (quoting Virgin v. Board of Review, 803 P2d. 1284, 
1287 (Utah App. 1990)) . 
R568-1-4.J states: 
All medical records shall be filed by the employer or 
its insurance carrier as a single joint medical exhibit 
at least one week before the scheduled hearing. 
Claimant must cooperate and submit all pertinent 
medical records contained in his file to the employer 
or its insurance carrier for the joint exhibit 
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submission two weeks in advance of the scheduled 
hearing. . . . 
(emphasis added). This rule was enacted to facilitate the speedy 
and fair adjudication of claims at the Industrial Commission. To 
allow medical reports to be submitted at the hearing would create 
confusion for the ALJ and opposing counsel and slow or stop the 
entire adjudication process. Time limits are set to give counsel 
the appropriate time required to prepare for trial. Two hours of 
work time is not enough to even properly review a lengthy report, 
let alone prepare any possible objections to a surprise argument. 
Although the Utah legislature has eased the rules of 
evidence for the Commission, it did not give the Commission 
authority to allow any and all evidence into trial. Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-88(1994) states: 
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner shall 
be bound by the usual common-law or statutory rules of 
evidence, or by any technical or formal rules of 
procedure, other than as herein provided or as adopted 
by the commission pursuant to this act. The commission 
may make its investigation in such manner as in its 
judgment is best calculated to ascertain the 
substantial rights of the parties and to carry out 
justly the spirit of the Workers' Compensation Act. 
The commission may receive as evidence and use as proof 
of any fact in dispute all evidence deemed material and 
relevant including, but not limited to the following: 
(c) Reports of investigators appointed by the 
commission. 
(emphasis added). The statute does not compel the Commission to 
allow in any evidence; however, it does require the Commission 
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to abide by rules of evidence "adopted by the commission." R568-
1-4.J is one of these rules that was specifically enacted for the 
Industrial Commission and it falls under the statute. 
By leaving out the emphasized clause, "... other than as 
herein provided or as adopted by the Commission pursuant to this 
act," from the statute, the Petitioners, in their brief, would 
have the Court believe that the Commission does not have any 
rules of evidence and that any evidence is admissible at any 
time. 
What the Petitioners have done and argued is like quoting 
the Preamble to the Constitution of the United States of America 
while leaving out the phrase, "...secure the Blessings of Liberty 
to ourselves and our posterity..." and then argue that the 
Preamble contains nothing about liberty. This argument and 
interpretation is erroneous. 
Furthermore, there are no records, or any evidence 
whatsoever, supporting the assertion that it is customary for the 
Industrial Commission to violate the rule (R568-1-4.J) by 
supplementing the medical exhibit at the hearing. (R. at 470). 
The Petitioners rely only on the fact that the ALJ allowed 
Kimball to supplement medical records post-hearing. However, 
they do not state that these records were requested by them. 
These were the medical records Kimball had brought with him from 
Indiana at the Petitioner's request. Unfortunately, Kimball's 
counsel left those records at his office. The ALJ simply left 
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the record open so the recent medical records the Petitioners 
wanted could be incorporated. 
It is a tenuous argument at best to stipulate, as the 
Petitioners do, that medical records should be added to the 
medical exhibit post-hearing, and then present this evidence to 
the Court as the only evidence that the Commission customarily 
violates Rule R568-1-4.J. 
In this case, all medical records in evidence, namely 
Dr. Humphreys', Dr. Yelton's, Dr. Fenwick's and Dr. Matick's 
reports, indicate that Kimball's medical problems are appropriate 
considering his industrial injury and that they are causally 
linked to that industrial injury. The Commission and the ALJ 
correctly based their decisions on these reports and ruled 
against allowing Dr. Knorpp's report into evidence because it was 
not presented in a timely manner. The records received post-
hearing were only records of Kimball's recent treatment, were of 
no significance to the case, and were requested by the 
Petitioners. Moreover, both parties stipulated that the evidence 
would be allowed into the record post-hearing. (R. at 529). 
Therefore, the Commission was acting properly when it did not 
allow Dr. Knorpp's report into evidence because it was not 
submitted at least one week before the hearing. 
B. KIMBALL PROPERLY RAISED THE ISSUE OF TIMELINESS. 
Kimball properly raised the issue of timeliness at trial 
when he said, ". . . based upon this late file review," (R. at 
15 
483, Line 7) and again when he said, "It [the file review] is too 
little too late," (R. at 486, Line 19). In section III of the 
argument in his Response to the Defendants' Motion for Review, 
Kimball again raised the issue of timeliness. (R. at 355-56). 
See Ashcroft v. Industrial Comm'n, 855 P2d. 267, 268 (Utah App. 
1993). An issue must be put to the administrative agency before 
it may be raised on appeal, and in this case the Industrial 
Commission explicitly ruled on the issue of timeliness twice, 
both in its Order Denying Motion for Review and its Order Denying 
Request for Reconsideration. Additionally, it only becomes 
"error to adjudicate issues not raised at trial" when those 
issues could have been, but were not, raised in the pleadings. 
See Hilton Hotel v. Industrial Comm'n, 897 P2d. 352, 356 (Utah 
App. 1995). Because the issue of timeliness did not arise until 
the day of trial, it could not have been in the pre-trial 
pleadings. Therefore, mentioning at the trial that the file 
review was late and again in the Response to the Defendants' 
Motion for Review was the proper place to raise the issue. 
Even if this Court determines that Kimball did not 
adequately raised the issue at trial, he can still raise it at 
the appellate level under the following law: 
Generally a [party] who fails to bring an issue before 
the trial court is barred from asserting it initially 
on a p p e a l . . . . 
However, there are two limited but well-established 
exceptions to this rule. An appellate court may 
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address [an] issue for the first time on appeal if: 
(1) the court committed "plain error"; or (2) there are 
"exceptional circumstances." (citations omitted). 
The second exception to the rule prohibiting 
consideration of issues for the first time on appeal is 
a catch-all device requiring "exceptional" or "unusual" 
circumstances. It is a safety device to make certain 
that manifest injustice does not result from the 
failure to consider an issue on appeal. Both the Utah 
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have often 
acknowledged this exception. 
State v. Archambeau, 820 P2d. 920, 922-23 (Utah App. 1991); See 
73A C.J.S. Public Administrative Law and Procedure 191 n.93 
(1983). Because the Respondent's counsel did not receive Dr. 
Knorpp's report until two business hours before the hearing, he 
did not have adequate time to prepare extensive or conclusive 
arguments to object to the report. (R. at 356). The purpose of 
R568-1-4.J is to avoid this type of attack. Accordingly, having 
only two hours to derive a defense does create an "exceptional" 
circumstance that justifies raising the issue initially in the 
Court of Appeals. 
Injustice would result if surprise evidence were allowed 
into trial because every possible defense or objection could not 
be made to its admission. Evidence would always be admitted late 
if this were the case because it would give the party admitting 
it an advantage. For example, in this case, the cover letter 
sent to Dr. Knorpp with the medical records could be helpful to 
Kimball's position. The letter was not voluntarily produced and 
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because of the violation of the rules Kimball never had a chance 
to procure such. 
The Petitioners argue that this would not have prejudiced 
Kimball because he chose not to review the medical records 
exhibit until the day of the hearing. Once again, the 
Petitioners are misrepresenting the facts. After receiving 
Petitioners' letter dated February 14, 1995, the Respondent 
telephoned the legal adjuster for this case and requested a copy 
of the complete medical exhibit on February 20, 1995. The WCF 
sent a copy of the complete exhibit with a cover letter dated 
February 22, 1995. (Appendix B). This medical exhibit is 
identical to the medical exhibit the Respondents received at 
hearing. 
In addition, Kimball is not dependent on the WCF's medical 
records in that he collected his own medical records. 
From the arguments, it is clear that the Respondents raised R568-
1-4.J in a timely manner. 
C. THIS CASE DOES NOT REQUIRE A MEDICAL PANEL. 
The Industrial Commission is only required to convene a 
medical panel in a limited number of circumstances as outlined in 
Utah Admin. Code R568-1-9, which states: 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the Commission 
adopts the following guidelines in determining the 
necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative 
Law Judge where: 
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1. One or more significant medical issues 
may be involved. Generally a significant 
medical issue must be shown by conflicting 
medical reports. Significant medical issues 
are involved when there are: 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy 
amounting to more than $2,000. 
(emphasis added). This rule shows that having medical expenses 
in excess of $2,000 by itself is not sufficient to convene a 
medical panel, but that the expenses must be in controversy. 
However, to have medical expenses in controversy there must be 
reports on record that dispute the expenses. See Chase v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 872 P2d. 475, 479-80 (Utah App. 1994); 
Willardson v. Industrial Comm'n, 904 P2d. 671 (Utah 1995). 
The Respondents admit that the Willardson case does expand 
the use of medical panels outlined in U.C.A. §35-1-77. However, 
in the Willardson case, the Commission gave little weight to the 
admitted medical records of the two treating physicians. In this 
case, the medical record in question was ruled inadmissible. 
Because Dr. Knorpp's report was not admissible evidence, there is 
no medical conflict or controversy. Further, all of the reports 
from every other doctor Kimball saw [Dr. Humphreys, Dr. Yelton 
(who is the WCF's physician), Dr. Fenwick and Dr. Matick] agree 
that the expenses were justified. (R. at 368). 
Additionally, the Petitioners were not prejudiced by the 
exclusion of Dr. Knorpp's report because it would have been 
entitled to very little weight had it been admitted. (R. at 
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3 67). The report would have had little persuasive value because 
Dr. Knorpp did not personally examine Kimball, did not even talk 
with Kimball, is not a specialist in the appropriate field, and 
had no actual diagnostic studies to facilitate him in his file 
review as is required by the American Medical Association's 
guidelines, which have been adopted in this jurisdiction. (R. at 
507). Even if Dr. Knorpp's report had been admitted, using the 
above reasoning, the case was not mandated to go to a medical 
panel contrary to the Petitioner's interpretation of Willardson. 
VII 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission properly excluded Dr. Knorpp's 
report as medical evidence under Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.J. 
There are no reported exceptions to this rule, and there is no 
evidence before this Court showing that the action was contrary 
to prior agency policy. 
The Respondent timely objected to Dr. Knorpp's report. 
However, even if the Court finds that he did not, Kimball did not 
have time to prepare all-encompassing objections to the admission 
of Dr. Knorpp's report into evidence, which creates a recognized 
exception to the general rule of raising issues. Because Dr. 
Knorpp's report is not admissible evidence, there are no medical 
expenses in controversy and the Industrial Commission properly 
ruled that a medical panel was not necessary. 
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The Respondents are disappointed with the Petitioners' 
continued attempts to distort the facts in this case, and they 
believe that the creative editing of statutes and rules to convey 
false interpretations to be inappropriate. 
Furthermore, the Petitioners have again failed to be prompt 
in this case. A copy of the Petitioners's Brief was attested to 
be sent to the Respondents on June 21, 1996 although the mailing 
label shows it was sent on June 24. (Appendix B). 
For the aforementioned reasons, this Court should uphold the 
decision of the Industrial Commission and order the Petitioners 
to comply with the ALJ's Order. 
DATED this 1&-day of ^ 
T-
1996 
C lyr^-— 
T. Jdjf^jsy Cottle 
Counsel for Respondent 
John R. Kimball 
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APPENDIX A 
Utah Admin, woae 
A. For the purposes of Section 63-46b-3, U.1 , all 
adjudicative proceedings for workers' compensation and 
occupational disease claims shall only be commenced by the 
injured worker or dependent filing a request for agency 
action with the Commission. The Administrative Law Judge Is 
afforded discretion in allowing intervention of other 
parties pursuant to Section 63-46b-9, U.C.A. The 
Application for Hearing is the request for agency action. 
All such applications shall include supporting medical 
documentation of the claim where there is a dispute over 
medical issues. Applications without supporting 
documentation will not be mailed to the employer ox 
insurance carrier for answer until the appropriate documents 
have been provided. 
B. Whenever a claim, for compensation benefits Is denied by 
an employer or insurance carrier, the burden rests on the 
applicant to initiate the action by filing an Application 
for Hearing with the Commission 
C. Whenever an Application for Hearing is filed with the 
Commission, the Commission shall forthwith mail a copy to 
the employer or" to the employer's Insurance carrier. 
D. The employer or insurance carrier shall have 3 0 days 
following the date of the mailing of the application to file 
a written answer with the Industrial Commission, admitting 
or denying liability for the claim. The answer should state 
all affirmative defenses with sufficient accuracy and detail 
that an applicant may be fully Informed of the nature of the 
defense asserted. All answers shall include a summary and 
categorization of benefits paid to date on the claim. A 
copy shall be sent to the applicant or, if there is one, t : 
the applicant's attorney by the defendant. 
E. When an employer or Insurance carrier fails to file an 
answer within the 3 0 days provided above, the Commission may 
enter a default against such employer or insurance carrier. 
The Commission may then set the matter for hearing, take 
evidence bearing on the claim, and enter an Order based on 
the evidence presented. Such defaults may be set aside by 
following the procedure outlined in the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. Said default shall apply to the defendant 
employer or insurance carrier and shall not be construed to 
deprive the Employers' Reinsurance Fund or the Uninsured 
Employers' Fund of any appropriate defenses. 
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F, Where the answer denies liability solely on the medical 
aspects of the case, the applicant through his/her attorney 
or agent, and the employer or insurance carrier, with the 
approval of the Commission or its representative, may enter 
into a stipulated set of facts, which stipulation, together 
with the medical documents bearing on the case in the 
commission's file, may be used in making the final 
determination of liability. 
G, When deemed appropriate, the Commission or its 
representative may have a pre-hearing or post-hearing 
conference. 
H. Upon filing of the Answer, the defendant may commence 
discovery with appropriate sets of interrogatories. Such 
discovery should focus on the accident event, witnesses, as 
well as past and present medical care. The defendant shall 
also be entitled to appropriately signed medical releases to 
allow gathering of pertinent medical records. The defendant 
may also require the applicant to submit to an independent 
medical examination to be conducted by a physician of the 
defendant's choice. Failure of an applicant to comply with 
such requests may result in the dismissal of a claim or 
delay in the scheduling of a hearing. 
I. Commission subpoena forms shall be used in all discovery 
proceedings and must be signed, unless good cause is shown 
for a shorter period, at least one week prior to any 
scheduled hearing. 
J. All medical records shall be filed by the employer or 
its insurance carrier as a single joint medical exhibit at 
least one week before the scheduled hearing. Claimant must 
cooperate and submit all pertinent medical records contained 
in his file to the employer or its insurance carrier for the 
joint exhibit submission two weeks in advance of the 
scheduled hearing. Exhibits are to be placed in an indexed 
binder arranged by a care provider in chronological order. 
Exhibits should include all relevant treatment records with 
the exception of hospital nurses notes. 
K. The Administrative Law Judge must be notified one week 
in advance of any proceeding where it is anticipated that 
more than four witnesses will be called, or where it is 
anticipated that the hearing of the evidence will require 
more than two hours. 
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I i Decisions of the presiding officer i n any adjudicative 
proceeding will be issued in accordance with the provisions 
of Section 63-46b-5 or 63-46b-10, U.C.A 
M, Any party to an adjudicative proceeding seeking review 
of an Order by the Agency may file a written request for 
review in accordance with the provisions of Sections 63-46b-
12, 63-46b-13, 63-46b-14, 63-46b-15, and 63-46b-16 r ~ ' 
A Motion for Review of any order entered by an 
Administrative Law Judge may be filed pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 63-46b-12, U.C.A, Unless so filed, 
the Order will become the award of the Commission and will 
be final. If appropriately filed, the Administrative Law 
Judge may: 
] Reopen the case and enter a Supplemental Order 
after holding such further hearing and receiving siich 
further evidence as may be deemed necessary, 
2 Amend or modify the prior Order by a Supplemental 
Order, or 
3. Refer the entire case to the C Dmmission for review 
under Section 35-1-82.53, U.C.A 
If the Administrative Law Judge enters a Supplemental 
Order, as provided above, it shall be final unless a 
Motion for Review of the same is filed with the 
Commission. 
N. In formal adjudicative proceedings, the Industrial 
Commission shall generally foil ow the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure regarding discovery and the issuance of subpoenas, 
except as the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are modified by 
the express provisions of Section 35-1-88, U.C.A., or as may 
be otherwise modified by the presiding officer. 
0. A request for reconsideration of a Commission's Order on 
Motion for Review may be allowed and shall be governed by 
the provisions of Section 63-46b-13/ U.C.A. Any petition 
for judicial review of the Commission's Order on Motion for 
Review shall be governed by the provision of Section 63-46b-
14, U.C.A. 
U t a h Aii i i i in mi in < Il IK f II I  "I r - i n i d f * ! i n e i s P i n rill; i 1, I z a t " : i o n f Medical 
Pane l . 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-/7, U.C.A., the Commission adopts 
the following guidelines in determining the necessity of 
submitting a case to a medical panel: 
A A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law 
J udge wherei 
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1. One or more significant medical issues may be 
involved. Generally a significant medical issue 
must be shown by conflicting medical reports. 
Significant medical issues are involved when there 
are: 
(a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent 
physical impairment which vary more than 5% 
of the whole person, 
(b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the 
temporary total cutoff date which vary more 
than 90 days, and/or 
(c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting 
to more than $2,000. 
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be 
scheduled if there is a proffer of conflicting medical 
testimony showing a need to clarify the medical panel 
report. Where there is a proffer of new written 
conflicting medical evidence, the Administrative Law 
Judge may, in lieu of a hearing, resubmit the new 
evidence to the panel for consideration and 
clarification. 
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an 
injured worker to be examined by another physician for 
the purpose of obtaining a further medical examination 
or evaluation pertaining to the medical issues 
involved, and to obtain a report addressing these 
medical issues in all cases where: 
1. The treating physician has failed or refuses 
to give an impairment rating, 
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to 
be non-industrial, and/or 
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such 
further evaluation. 
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical 
panel or medical consultant and of their appearance at 
a hearing, as well as any expenses for further medical 
examination or evaluation, as directed by the 
Administrative Law Judge, shall be paid out of the 
Employers' Reinsurance Fund. 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-88. Rules of evidence and procedure before 
commission and hearing examiner - Admissible evidence. 
Neither the commission nor its hearing examiner shall be 
bound by the usual common-law or statutory rules of 
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evidence, or by any technical or f. .
 c i . - .-t, 
other than as herein provided or as p-;ea ny zhe 
commission pursuant to this act. The commission may make 
its investigation in such manner as ir: its judgment is best 
calculated to ascertain the substantial rights of the 
parties and to carry out justly the spirit of the Workers' 
Compensation Ac t. 
The
 c o r n m i s s i o n m a y receive as evidence and use as proof 
of any fact in dispute all evidence deemed material and 
relevant including,, but not limited to the following: 
(a) Depositions and sworn testimony presented in open 
hearings. 
(b) Report.: of et^endi^^ -,* exam:!' . ncr physicians. .1 of 
pathologists 
(c) Reports c: _:. ~ ^. 
commission-
ed) Report-- of employers, _ncludi: 4 copies c:. rime 
sheets, book accounts or other records. 
(e) Hospital records : - -he case ^-F ^T-
diseased employee. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-4bb~+ .^ . 1. . 1 
adjudicative proceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court 
of Appeal has jurisdiction to review all final agency action 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action 
resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings, the 
petitioner shall file a petition for review of agency 
action with the appropriate appellate court in the form 
required by the appellate rules of the appropriate 
appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate 
court shall govern all additional filings and 
proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's 
record for judicial review of formal adjudicative 
proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate 
to shorten , summarize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing 
transcripts and copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to 
stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the 
record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the 
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person 
seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by 
any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which 
the agency action is based, is unconstitutional on its 
face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction 
conferred by any statute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues 
requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied 
the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or 
decision-making process, or has failed to follow 
prescribed procedure; 
(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally 
constituted as a decision-making body or were subject 
to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of 
fact, made or implied by the agency, that is not 
supported by substantial evidence when viewed in light 
of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the 
agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, 
unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by 
giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a fair 
and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
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APPENDIX B 
Safe and Sound Thinking 
February, $.995 
T. JEFFERY COTTLE, ESQUIRE 
387 WEST CENTER STREET 
OREMUT 84057 
RE: Claimant: 
File No,: 
Inj. Date: 
Employer: 
Dear Jeff: 
John Kimball 
93-17987-8M 
3-15-93 
Stampede Tn lckii lg 
Enclosed, please find all medical records we have collected to date regarding Won. 
Compensation Fund claimant John Kimball. These records are not in their final form,, as we are 
awaiting updates from, a couple of providers. As soon as those are received and the records • 
in their final form, a copy will be made available to yoi i I Jntil, then, I hope these will help 
As always, it's a pleasure doing business. 
Jincerely, 
Michael J. Bowman 
Legal Adjuster 
288-8055 
MB 
Enclosure 
392 East 6400 South Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 Phone (801) J&8-8000 
WCF Workers Compensation Fund of Utah PO Box 57929 Salt Lake City Utah 84157 0929 
To: 
T. Jeffery Cottle 
Attorney at Law 
387 West Center Street 
Orem, UT 84057 
